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Abstract. Climate change is expected to have far-reaching impacts. Earlier studies have estimated 
an aggregated monetised damage equivalent to 1.5 to 2.0 % of World GDP (for 2 x CO2). According 
to these estimates, the OECD would face losses equivalent to 1.0 to 1.5 % of GDP, and developing 
countries 2.0 to 9.0 %. While these figures are preliminary and highly uncertain, recent findings have 
not, as yet, changed the general picture. As is shown in this paper, estimates that are fully corrected 
for differences in purchasing power parity do not significantly differ from the initial figures. Newer 
studies increasingly emphasise adaptation, variability, extreme events, other (non-climate change) 
stress factors, and the need for integrated assessment of damages. Incorporating these factors has 
lead to increased differences in estimated impacts between different regions and sectors. Estimates of 
market impacts in developed countries tended to fall, while non-market impacts have become more 
important. Marginal damages are more interesting from a policy point of view. Earlier estimates 
range from about $5 to $125 per tonne of carbon, with most estimates at the lower end of this range. 
These figures are based on power functions in the level of climate change. The rate of change may 
be equally important, as are the speed of adaptation, restoration and value adjustment. Furthermore, 
future vulnerability to climate change will differ from current vulnerability: market impacts could 
fall (relatively) with economic growth while non-market impacts may rise. 
Key words: Climate change damage costs 
1. Introduction 
Knowledge on the impacts of climate change is one of the key factors for an 
informed policy response. Such knowledge can be presented in many different 
ways. One way is to express all impacts in a single metric, such as money. Using a 
monetary metric is an obvious choice for reasons of convenience, but also because 
it facilitates the comparison of damage costs with the costs of emission reduction. 
Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has 
extensively reviewed the physical impacts of climate change on human society and 
natural ecosystems (Tegart et al., 1990; Tegart and Sheldon, 1992; Watson et al., 
1996). This paper reviews available monetary damage assessments, starting from 
the work of Chapter 6 of lPCC Working Group III (Pearce etal., 1996; cf. also 
Fankhauser 1994b, 1995a, and Tol, 1993, but adding more recent evidence and 
developments. 
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Information on the impacts of global warming is now available for several 
regions and countries (Pearce et al., 1996; Watson et al., 1996). The best studied 
regions are developed countries, in particular the United States, where climate 
change impacts have been analysed in a series of studies, following initial work 
by Smith and Tirpak (1989). Other OECD regional studies include CRU/ERL 
(1992) for the European Union; Parry and Duncan (1995) for the United Kingdom; 
Kuoppomaeki (1996) for Finland; and Nishioka etal. (1995) for Japan. In the 
context of an Asian Development Bank (ADB, 1994) project on climate change 
in Asia, global warming impacts have also been analysed for a number of Asian 
countries (cf. also SAARC, 1992). 
Further information on the vulnerability to climate change is increasingly 
becoming available as countries prepare their first national communication to the 
Climate Convention. A series of country studies have been, and are being, under- 
taken in this context. First results are reported in Dixon et al. (1996), Lenhart et al. 
(1996) and Smith etal. (1996). The global study of Stzrepek and Smith (1995) 
contains case studies for Africa, Latin America and Asia. Note that, like most 
damage studies, these assessments are not comprehensive with regard to the range 
of impacts covered, and that no monetized evaluations are usually undertaken. 
Estimates generally combine the costs of adaptation (such as sea level rise 
protection) and the costs of residual damages (such as the inundation of unprotected 
areas). However, the assumed level of adaptation is usually arbitrarily chosen, and 
the process of how adaptation takes place is not spelled out. Exceptions include 
studies using (variants of) the hedonic approach (e.g., Mendelsohn etal., 1994; 
Darwin et al., 1995), a technique that assumes full adaptation but can only be used 
to compare two equilibrium situations. For sea level rise, the trade-off between 
protection and land loss is sometimes based on optimization calculus (Fankhauser, 
1995b; Yohe etal., 1995,1996). 
By far the best studied impact categories are agricultural impacts (cf. Reilly 
etal., 1996, for an overview) and the costs of sea level rise (cf. Bijlsma etal., 
1996). Other impact categories have been studied at a more rudimentary level, 
while some have hardly exceeded the back of the envelope stage. In addition, 
several types of impacts have largely been ignored so far, because they could not be 
sufficiently quantified. Prime examples include famines and vector-borne diseases. 
In both cases, non- climatic influences are dominant and complex. 
Attempts at a comprehensive monetary quantification of all impacts are rela- 
tively rare, and usually restricted to the United States (Cline, 1992a; Nordhaus, 
1991; Titus, 1992). Preliminary global estimates are found in Fankhauser (1995a) 
and To1 (1995). Comprehensive studies all take what may be called an enumerative 
approach, i.e., the impacts of climate change are first listed, then evaluated (mon- 
etised), and finally monetary estimates are added up. Possible synergies between 
effects are not taken into account. Furthermore, indirect effects are not considered. 
Each sector is treated in a partial analysis. Scheraga etal. (1993) is one of the few 
exceptions. 
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The following section surveys these studies in more detail. Compared to the 
Second Assessment Report of the IPCC (Pearce et al., 1996), the initial results are 
further corrected for purchasing power parity exchange rates and a typographical 
error is restored. The remaining sections then analyze how the assessments might 
change in the light of recent findings, and outlines further developments under way 
to improve on the current generation of estimates. 
2. Results from Equilibrium Analysis 
The scientific research on global warming impacts has focused predominantly on 
the potential climate change associated with the (arbitrarily chosen) 2 x CO2 sce- 
nario, i.e., the impacts of an atmospheric CO2 concentration of twice the preindus- 
trial level. In addition, most research focuses on the impact climate change would 
have on the present situation. Although counter-factual, this has the advantages 
that only one variable (climate) is varied, and that projections of future worlds are 
avoided. Most of the figures reported below are based on these two prerequisites. 
Climate change impacts can be classified as either market related or non-market 
related (impacts affecting ‘intangibles’ such as ecosystems or human amenity). 
Table I categorises the expected impacts from global warming. It also assesses how 
carefully they have been estimated in the literature so far. 
Monetary estimates of both market and non-market damages can be expressed in 
the form of willingness to pay to obtain a good or service (WTP), or willingness to 
accept compensation to forego a good or service (WTA). Roughly, WTP measures 
the amount of income a person is willing to forego in exchange for an improved 
state of the world, and WTA is an estimate of the compensation required in order to 
accept a deterioration. With regard to climate change, WTP values improvements 
relative to baseline climate change, while WTA values deteriorations from the 
present. In practical applications, the two measures are often used interchangeably, 
despite the fact that WTA estimates are generally higher than WTP, and sometimes 
substantially so. Studies on climate change damage costs predominantly focuses on 
WTP, although WTA has also beenused for some damage categories (e.g., mortality 
risks). Unfortunately, WTP/WTA estimates are not available for all global warming 
impacts. Reductions in revenues, the return on input factors (such as capital or 
land), and other indicators are frequently used to approximate the welfare impacts 
of climate change (see Table I). Often, WTPAVTA estimates are based on the 
transfer of results from issues other than climate change, or from one region to 
another. 
It is clear from Table I that despite a growing body of literature much remains to 
be done. Available estimates on the costs of climate change are neither accurate nor 
complete. There is a considerable range of error. Figures on developing countries 
in particular are usually based on approximation and extrapolation, and are clearly 
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less reliable than those for developed regions. Nevertheless, the available estimates 
can serve as an indication of the relative vulnerability of different regions. 
Climate change will affect a broad range of economic sectors and activities, 
as well as natural systems (cf. Table I). Table II shows the relative importance of 
different damage categories, using figures for the United States. As mentioned, the 
US is the country with the best available data to date. Impacts on coastal zones, 
human health, water supply and agricultural production are likely to be among 
the most serious effects. Note that estimates include both adaptation costs and 
residual damages. The former include the costs of coastal protection, the costs of 
migration, and the change in energy demand due to alterations in space heating 
and cooling requirements. The underlying adaptation assumptions, however, are 
not explicitly stated for most impact categories. Table III, which is based on 
the literature survey of IPCC Working Group III (Pearce &al., 1996), shows the 
aggregate damages typically associated with 2 x CO2. Figures vary between 0 and 
9 percent of GDP, with damages in developing countries typically higher than those 
in OECD countries. The estimates reported by IPCC, while in most cases corrected 
for differences in purchasing power parity (PPP), are expressed as a percentage of 
uncorrected GDP In addition to these figures, Table III also shows own calculations 
in which a PPP correction was made whenever this had not been done initially. 
These latter estimates are expressed as a percentage of real (PPP-corrected) GDP. 
The difference between the two sets of estimates is small compared to the likely 
range of error. 
Considerable regional differences are likely, with potentially higher impacts for 
some individual countries, such as small island states. Table IV shows some of the 
estimates underlying the PPP estimates of Table III, highlighting the substantial 
differences between regions (for details on the original estimates, cf. Pearce et al., 
1996). For the former Soviet Union, PPP corrected damage could be as low as 
0.4 percent of real (PPP-corrected) GDP, or even negative (climate change is 
potentially beneficial). Asia and Africa, on the other hand, could face extremely 
high damages, mainly due to the severe life/morbidity impacts. Estimates of the 
costs of mortality are extremely volatile and controversial, however, and should 
be interpreted with caution (cf. the discussion in Pearce et&., 1996). Developing 
countries generally tend to be more vulnerable to climate change than developed 
countries, because of the greater importance of agriculture, lower health standards 
and the stricter financial, institutional, and knowledge constraints on adaptation. 
The global estimates in Table III result from the aggregation of regional figures. The 
damage costs of each region are simply added up. This process has sometimes been 
criticised for not giving enough prominence to damages in developing countries. To 
incorporate equity considerations, one could make adjustments in the aggregation 
procedure. Fankhauser et al. (1996b) explore the issue of ‘equity weights’ in detail. 
The figures in Tables II to IV are best guess estimates - the ranges does not 
reflect the uncertainties. Explicit uncertainty assessments are rare and far from 
comprehensive (see Morgan and Keith, 1995; Nordhaus, 1994b; Parry, 1993; Tol, 
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Table II. Economic damages from 2 x CO2: Present US economy (base year 1990; billion $) 
2xcoz 
Cline 
(2.5”C) 
Fankhauser Nordhaus Titus To1 
(2.5’(Z)’ (3°C)’ (4°C) (2.5”C)’ 
Agriculture 
Forest loss 
Species loss 
Sea level rise 
Electricity 
Non-e]. heating 
Human amenity 
Human morbidity 
Human life 
Migration 
Hurricanes 
Construction 
Leisure activities 
Water supply 
availability 
pollution 
Urban infrastruc. 
Air pollution 
tropos. ozone 
other 
Mobile air cond. 
Total 
(% pf GDP) 
17.5 
3.3 
4.0 + a3 
7.0 
11.2 
-1.3 
+b3 
+c3 
5.8 
0.5 
0.8 
fd3 
1.7 
8.4 
0.7 
8.4 
9.0 
7.9 
8.4 
- 
- 
11.4 
0.6 
0.2 
- 
- 
7.0 
- 
0.1 
3.5 
t-e3 
15.6 
- 
- 
7.3 
- - 
61.1 69.5 
+a+b+cfd+e 
61.1 (1.3) 
1.1 1.2 
small 43.6 
4 - 
12.2 5.7 
1.1 5.6 
1.1 1.2 
- 
- 
9.4 
- 
- 
4 - 
11.4 
32.6 
27.2 
- 
2.5 
55.5 139.2 
(1.0) (2.5) 
10.0 
- 
5.0 
8.5 
- 
10.0 
12.0 
- 
37.4 
1.0 
0.3 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
74.2 
(1.5)* 
‘Transformed to 1990 base. 
2USA and Canada, base year 1988. 
31dentified, but not estimated. 
4Not assessed categories, estimated at 0.75% of GDP. 
Sources: Cline (1992a); Fankhauser (1995a); Nordhaus (1991); Titus (1992); To1 (1995). 
1995). They neglect the possibility of impact surprises, and of low probability/high 
impact events (such as a shut down of the Gulf Stream). As mentioned, figures have 
been derived by imposing 2 x CO:! onto a society with today’s structure. The long- 
term vulnerability profile could change as a consequence of economic development 
and population growth. The advantages of using today’s society are that only one 
variable (climate) is changed at the time, and that projections of future societies 
are avoided (see Tol, 1996, and Fankhauser and Tol, 1996, for further discussion). 
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Table III. Aggregate monetary damage for 2 x CO2 (Annual damages) 
391 
Region Damage 
Original IPCC estimate Full PPP correction 
(% of GDP) (% of real GDP’) 
Developed countries (OECD) l-2% l-4% 
Developing countries and 
Countries with economies in 2-9% O-7% 
Transition 
World 1.5-2% l-2% 
GDP corrected for differences in purchasing power parity. 
Source: Pearce et&. (1996) and own calculations. 
Table IV. Monetary 2 x CO2 damage in different world regions and share of tangible damage 
(PPP-corrected annual damages) 
Fankhauser To1 
bn$ %rGDP’ tangible2 bn$ %rGDP’ tangible2 
(%I (%I 
l European Union 
l United States 
. Other OECD 
l OECD America 
l OECD Europe 
9 OECD Pacific 
Total OECD 
l E. Europe/Former 
USSR 
. Centrally Planned 
Asia 
l South and South 
East Asia 
l Africa 
. Latin America 
. Middle East 
l Total non-OECD 
World 
63.6 1.4 0.58 
61.0 1.3 0.61 
55.9 1.2 0.59 
180.5 1.3 0.59 
29.g3 0.43 0.833 
50.74 2.94 o.904 
141.6 0.9 0.77 
322.0 1.1 0.67 
74.5 1.5 0.25 
57.4 1.6 0.05 
60.7 3.8 0.09 
192.7 1.9 0.14 
-14.8 -0.4 2.37 
-4.0 
92.2 5.3 0.74 
46.4 6.9 0.78 
40.3 3.1 0.65 
11.5 5.5 0.39 
171.8 1.7 0.46 
364.4 1.8 0.29 
-0.1 5.46 
‘PPP-corrected GDP. 
2Share of market in total damage. 
3Former USSR only. 
4China only. 
Source: Own calculations based on Pearce et al., 1996. 
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The relatively wide range of results shows that, although a rough picture on 
regional vulnerability to climate change is starting to emerge, much further research 
is necessary to improve the currently limited understanding of the issue. 
3. New Findings in Equilibrium Analysis 
The scientific understanding of climate change and climate change impacts is 
increasing rapidly. Socio- economic analysis that is based on these scientific find- 
ings tends to lag behind scientific progress. Most of the studies surveyed in the 
previous sections work with the climate and impact scenarios of the 1990 and 1992 
IF’CC reports (Houghton &al., 1990, 1992). New findings and methodological 
advancements that have taken place since then only now start to trickle down into 
socio-economic analysis. Important recent developments include: 
(a) Increased emphasis on adaptation: The important role of adaptation in climate 
change impact assessment has been increasingly recognised, and particularly 
in agricultural impact work, individual and societal responses to a changing 
climate are now regularly included in the analysis. As it turns out, model 
results are quite sensitive to assumptions on adaptability. Comparisons of 
model results with and without adaptation suggest that low-cost adaptation 
measures may reduce agricultural damages by about 30-60%, or even change 
the sign (Reilly et&., 1996; Darwin et&., 1995). 
(b) Increased emphasis on variability and extreme events: While many of the ear- 
lier studies focused on changes in the mean (mostly global mean temperature) 
increasing attention is being paid to the variability around that mean, changes 
in which e.g. dominate the impact on agriculture (Meams, 1995; Meams et al., 
1996a,b), and to weather extremes. Extremes, such as floods, droughts, heat 
waves, and storms, do not only determine a large share of the damage, they 
also drive adaptation (Downing et al., 1996). 
(c) Increased emphasis on non-climate change related stress factors: In many cas- 
es, climate change will add to already existing stress on natural ecosystems. 
Examples of such multiple stress situations include the development of coastal 
zones, water use, and land use change. The existence of multiple stress fac- 
tors could seriously compound ecosystem impacts (Watson etul., 1996). By 
implication, measures that tackle current environmental problems would seem 
to be a low-cost, or even ‘no-regret’ strategy to strengthen the resilience of 
ecosystems. A similar argument could also hold with respect to imperfections 
affecting the performance of the economic system, such as restrictions in the 
trade of agricultural goods, or insufficient nutritional and health standards. 
(d) Importance of integrated assessment: There are strong inter-linkages between 
the different sectors impacted by climate change, as well as between impact- 
ed sectors and those not directly affected by climate change. For example, 
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agricultural, forest and ecosystem impacts are linked through land use compe- 
tition; the scope for irrigation as an adaptive measure in the agricultural sector 
depends on the impacts felt in the water sector, and so on. In addition, there 
may be repercussions between impacts and possible mitigation policies, e.g. 
in the forestry, agriculture and energy sectors. To capture these effects climate 
change studies have increasingly made use of integrated assessment models 
(see Weyant etal., 1996, for a survey). This also ensures consistency between 
the underlying assumptions. 
How do these and other scientific developments affect the damage assessment of 
the previous sections? Three broad tendencies seem to emerge. 
Trend 1: Increasing Regional and Sectoral Differences 
Recent findings stress the regional diversity of impacts. The notion that a warmer 
world will know winners as well as losers now features far more prominently than 
in the first generation of assessments. A recent study for Finland, for instance, 
finds this country to be a net winner from climate change (Kuoppomaeki, 1996). 
Agricultural studies such as Rosenzweig and Parry (1994), Reilly et al. (1994) or 
Darwin et al. (1995) identify many developed and other northern latitude countries 
as possible winners, provided farmers take adequate adaptation measures. Food 
insecurity in the South, on the other hand, is likely to be further aggravated. 
Differences are also increasingly emphasised between different regions within 
a country, and between different agents, sectors and commodities. A US forestry 
study by Callaway et al. (1994) is a good example. It estimates annual losses in 
US welfare ($2.5-6.5 m/yr for 2.5”C warming) that are comparable to e.g. Cline’s 
(1992a) initial estimate ($3.3 m), but with significant differences for individual 
regions and products. For example, softwood yields are expected to decrease, 
except in the North West, while yields in hardwood would mostly increase, except 
perhaps in the South. Producers could significantly gain as a consequence of higher 
prices, while consumer surplus is expected to drop (Callaway etal., 1994). 
Trend 2: Lower Market Impacts in Developed Countries 
Re-assessments of market-related impacts in developed countries have in many 
cases lead to a reduction in expected impacts compared to earlier estimates. Yohe 
et al. (1996), for example, observe a continuous decrease in estimated damage costs 
from sea level rise. Calculations for the US by Rosenthal et al. (1995) suggest that 
earlier estimates of energy sector costs may have been too high, and that climate 
change may in fact be beneficial for the energy sector in many US regions, More 
recent agricultural estimates also tend to be lower than earlier assessments (Darwin 
et al., 1995; Mendelsohn &al., 1995; Adams et aZ., 1994). 
Adjustments in estimates have occurred for a variety of reasons. In the case of sea 
level rise, much of the downscaling occurred as a result of discounting effects and 
more modest rise scenarios. One of the reasons for lower damages in the Adams 
et al. (1994) study is their extension of the model to include more heat tolerant 
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crops such as fruits and vegetables. In many cases, however, lower estimates are 
predominantly the result of better incorporation of the effects of adaptation. 
Whether this trend to decreasing estimates of market impacts can be extended 
from industrialised countries to other regions is not clear. The answer depends 
on the exact reasons that have led to a reassessment. Reductions associated with 
adaptation effects, for example, will not extend to other regions as easily as, say, the 
effect of a lower sea level rise projection. It is generally assumed that developing 
countries will lack the financial, institutional and technical capacity to efficiently 
adapt to a warmer world in the same way as industrialised countries will (Reilly 
et al., 1996; in fact, this is one of the reasons why regional variability of damages 
is higher in recent studies). Estimates of market impacts on developing countries 
(given their current situation) may therefore fall to a lesser extent. 
Trend 3: Increasing Importance of Non-Market Impacts 
While estimates of market impacts are often corrected downwards, new results on 
non-market impacts suggest that these effects may initially have been underesti- 
mated. Improvements in this area have not so much occurred with respect to the 
accuracy of figures - it remains low - than with respect to their comprehensive- 
ness. Some non-market impacts that were neglected in earlier analysis for lack 
of data can now be quantified. This is most notably the case for health impacts, 
where numerical estimates are now available for the expected spread of malaria 
in a warmer world. Integrated modelling work by Matsuoka and Kai (1995) sug- 
gests a lo-30% increase in areas with potential malaria risk, while Martens etal. 
(1994) expect several million additional malaria cases by the year 2100. Recent 
speculation about a link between climate change and the spread of diseases such 
as cholera and dengue fever suggest that the health impacts of climate change may 
have been underestimated so far (McMicheal et al., 1996). In addition, the risk of 
hunger (Rosenzweig and Parry, 1994) and migration (Myers and Kent, 1995) have 
gained more analytical attention. 
Since the finalization of the IPCC Second Assessment Report, one new compre- 
hensive study of the damage costs of climate change has emerged, of which drafts 
are currently circulated (Mendelsohn et al., 1996a,b). Although the study does not 
deal with all of the above developments and trends, it is sometimes referred to as 
a ‘new generation of damage estimation’. Adaptation is brought prominently to 
the fore (consequently,market impacts in developing countries are estimated lower 
than in earlier assessments), but most of the other points are neglected. While 
the importance of non-market impacts is acknowledged, the study by and large 
concentrates on tangible damages. Attention focuses on the opportunity costs of 
a different climate. Transition effects and the process of adaptation are ignored. 
Novel is the presentation of damages as a&fiction of temperature as well as precip- 
itation. Earlier studies had merely analysed damage for a benchmark temperature 
change. As with earlier studies, the USA is again studied in detail while damages 
for the rest of the world are derived by extrapolation. 
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Table V. Market impacts (per cent of GDP), 25°C warming’ 
Region Fankhauser Mendelsohn et al. To1 
OECD 0.77 -0.17 0.27 
non-OECD 0.67 0.03 0.76 
‘North” 0.60 -0.23 -0.06 
‘South” 1.02 0.17 1.66 
World 0.72 -0.08 0.52 
‘Mendelsohn et al. assume a 2.5”C rise in global mean temperature to take place in 2060, 
whereas Fankhauser and To1 assume this to happen in 2050. Note that only To1 has damage 
depending on the rate of climate change. In all three cases, vulnerability is assumed as in 
1988/1990. 
‘The countries subsumed under the labels ‘North’ and ‘South’ differ between the assess- 
ments. Fankhauser’s North is OECD plus former Soviet Union. Mendelsohn et al. ‘s North is 
North and Central America, Europe and Oceania for damages, and USA, other OECD and 
former Soviet Union for GDP. TOYS North is OECD plus Central and Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. 
Sources: Fankhauser (1995a), To1 (1995), Mendelsohn et al. (1996a,b) and own calculations. 
Table V compares the findings of Mendelsohn etal. (1996b) with those of 
Fankhauser (1995a) and To1 (1995) (for market damage only). The more recent 
study by Mendelsohn et al. is consistently more optimistic than the earlier work. 
This is because Mendelsohn etal. assume a greater adaptation potential than 
Fankhauser and To1 do, and often ignore the costs of adaptation. However, by 
extrapolating the adaptation potential of the US to other regions, Mendelsohn et al. 
probably overestimate the adaptive capacity of developing countries. Fankhauser 
and To1 in contrast use evidence from outside the USA where available. In terms 
of results, Fankhauser is most pessimistic for the OECD, the ‘north’ and the world, 
while To1 is most pessimistic about the non- OECD and the ‘south’. The best guess 
of both Mendelsohn etal. and To1 is that the ‘north’ may gain from a modest cli- 
mate change. Mendelsohn etal. come to the same conclusion for the OECD and 
the world. 
4. Results from Dynamic Analysis 
The analysis so far was confined to comparative statics. All figures in Tables II to 
V are estimates of the impact of one specific change of the climate (2 x CO2) on 
the current economy. This is clearly insufficient. Not only will we, for the larger 
part of the future, be confronted with climate change substantially different from 
2 x COz, but socio- economic vulnerability to climate change could also shift as a 
consequence of economic development. 
What would be relevant to know from a policy point of view are marginal 
figures, i.e., estimates of the extra damage done by one extra tonne of carbon 
emitted. Unfortunately, the requirements for marginal damage calculations go far 
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beyond the information available from 2 x CO2 studies. Greenhouse gases are stock 
pollutants. That is, fractions of the gas, once emitted, remain in the atmosphere 
for several decades, and consequently affect climate over this period of time. 
Calculating marginal costs therefore requires the comparison of two present value 
terms: The discounted sum of future damages associated with a certain emission 
scenario has to be compared to the discounted sum of damages in an alternative 
scenario with marginally different emissions in the base period. In estimates based 
on optimal control models (e.g., Nordhaus, 1994a; Peck and Teisberg, 1991,1993) 
the marginal costs is calculated as the shadow price of carbon, i.e., the carbon tax 
necessary to keep emissions on the socially optimal trajectory. 
The current generation of models deals with this challenge in a rather ad hoc 
manner, using very simplistic representations of the complex dynamic processes 
involved. In older studies damage costs were typically specified as a power (usually 
linear to cubic) function of global mean temperature, calibrated around the 2 x CO2 
estimates. Damage is usually fully reversible and typically assumed to grow with 
GDP. Only recently, studies have started to emerge which explicitly incorporate 
regionally diversified temperatures and sea levels, model individual damage cate- 
gories (e.g., agriculture) separately, or at least distinguish between damages related 
to absolute temperature level and those related to the rate of change (Dowlatabadi 
and Morgan, 1993; Hope et&., 1993; Tol, 1995, 1996). A first step towards a 
response function (rather than point estimates) of the opportunity costs of climate 
change was made by Mendelsohn et al. (1996a,b). 
Table VI provides a list of estimates of the marginal damages obtained from 
polynomial damage models. Estimates range from about $5 to $125 per tonne of 
carbon, with most estimates at the lower end of this range. The wide range reflects 
variations in model assumptions, as well as the high sensitivity of figures to the 
choice of the discount rate (on discounting, cf. e.g. Arrow &al., 1996). Estimates 
are expected to rise over time as a consequence of economic growth and increasing 
concentration levels. 
Using his DICE model, Nordhaus (1994a) finds a shadow price starting at about 
$5 per tonne of carbon in 1995, subsequently rising-to about $10 by 2025, and 
reaching $21 by 2095 (at 1990 prices). Peck and Teisberg (1991,1993) find values 
of a similar order of magnitude. Tol’s (1994) alternative specification of DICE 
yields shadow prices of $13 for 1995, rising to $89 for 2095. These model runs 
all assume that parameter values are known with certainty. In the case of DICE, 
expected shadow prices more than double once uncertainty is added to the model. 
This result arises because of the skewedness in the damage distribution, which 
allows for low probability - high impact events (Nordhaus, 1994a). Risk aversion 
and concave damage functions further enhance this effect (Tol, 1995). 
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Table VI. The marginal social costs to the world of CO2 emissions (current value (199O)$/tC 
Study Type’ 1991- 2001- 201 l- 2021- 
2000 2010 2020 2030 
Nordhaus MC 7.3 
(0.3-65.9)* 
Ayres and MC 30-35 
Walter 
Nordhaus CBA 
-best guess 5.3 6.8 8.6 10.0 
- expected value 12.0 18.0 26.5 na. 
Cline CBA 5.8-124 7.6-154 9.8-186 11.8-221 
Peck and Teisberg CBA lo-12 12-14 14-18 18-22 
Fankhauser3 MC 20.3 22.8 25.3 27.8 
(6.2-45.2)* (7.4-52.9) (8.3-58.4) (9.2-64.2) 
Maddison CBA/ 5.9-6.1 8.1-8.4 11.1-11.5 14.7-15.2 
MC 
‘MC = marginal social cost study; CBA = shadow value in a cost-benefit study. 
2Figures in brackets denote 90% confidence intervals. 
3Fully corrected for PPP-exchange rates, Fankhauser’s estimates would be about a factor 1.2 
higher. 
Sources: Pearce et al. (1996); see alsl Ayres and Walter (1991); Nordhaus (1991, 1994); Cline 
(1992b, 1993); Fankhauser (1994a); Peck and Teisberg (1991, 1993); Maddison (1994). 
The studies mentioned above all assume a pure rate of time preference (or utility 
discount rate) of 3%. In contrast, Cline (1992b, 1993)* finds significantly higher 
shadow prices by using a zero utility discount rate. His reproduction of the DICE 
model generates a path of shadow prices beginning at about $45 per tonne, reaching 
about $243 by 2100. Other parameter specifications provide even higher values. 
Fankhauser (1994a) identifies a lower and flatter trajectory for the shadow price 
of carbon, rising from $20 per tonne by 1991-2000 to $28 per tonne by 2021- 
2030, with confidence intervals, of $6-45 and $9-64, respectively. Fankhauser 
uses a probabilistic approach to the range of discount rates, in which low and high 
discount rates are given different weights. His sensitivity analysis with the discount 
rate suggest that moving from high (3%) to low (0%) discounting could increase 
marginal costs by about a factor 9, from $5.5 to $49 per tonne of carbon emitted 
now. 
As noted, most of the above studies model damage as a function of the level 
of climate change only. Arguably, the rate of climate change may be equally, and 
* Cline, W.R.: 1992b, Optimal Carbon Emissions over Time: Experiments with the Nordhaus 
DICE Model (draft). 
Cline, W.R.: 1993, Modeling Economically ESJicient Abatement of Greenhouse Gases (draft). 
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perhaps even more important than the absolute level of change. Similarly, the costs 
of adaptation may be as important as the opportunity costs of foregone welfare. 
These issues have been little studied so far (cf. Fankhauser and Tol, 1996; Tol, 
1996), even though the importance of adaptation is now well-recognized. 
Successful adaptation depends on a variety of factors, all of which are difficult to 
model. It requires first of all a recognition of the necessity to adapt, and, following 
this recognition, knowledge about available options, the capacity to assess them 
and the ability to implement the most suitable ones. Recognition of the need to 
adapt in turn is fostered through awareness building measures (including research 
and dissemination) but also arises from experience. The insurance industry is a 
good example. The series of violent storms and floods since the late 1980s has 
made insurers aware of their exposure to weather hazards. A number of adaptation 
measures have already been implemented as a consequence, and more are being 
studied and discussed (cf. Downing et al., 1996). The ability to identify, assess 
and implement adaptation options is hampered by the prevailing uncertainties. 
Without a clear picture of future climate, adaptation will initially be limited to 
options that make the system under consideration more flexible or more robust 
to weather variations. An exception are cases such as sea level rise, where the 
direction of change is known, although the magnitude and timing are not. Current 
adaptation measures will also be restricted to investments with a sufficiently long 
lifetime to witness substantial climate change (such as buildings, waterworks, 
natural reserves). For systems with a more rapid turnover time (e.g., agricultural 
practice) current measures will probably focus on building appropriate institutions 
and knowledge infrastructure (including medium-term climate forecasts and their 
dissemination to stakeholders). 
Changes in socio-economic vulnerability are similarly important. Vulnerabil- 
ity to climate change will change through exogenous factors as well as through 
dedicated adaptation measures. The rough pattern of such change can be deduced 
from Table VI: Poorer regions appear to be more vulnerable to climate change than 
richer ones, presumably, as noted above, because they face stricter constraints on 
technology, capital and institutions. In addition, poorer countries tend to have a 
greater share of their economy in weather-sensitive sectors, in particular agricul- 
ture. Table VI also shows that the share of tangible impacts on total damage is 
greater in poorer regions, which again reflects the importance of weather-sensitive 
sectors and the relatively low valuation of intangible impacts. Hence, with growing 
affluence, tangible damages can be expected to fall (relative to income). Intangible 
damage on the other hand may rise, because of the impact of per capita income on 
valuation (see Fankhauser and Tol, 1996; Tol, 1996). Health damages may be an 
exception from this rough rule of thumb, as one would expect health care standards 
to improve with increasing affluence and this may offset the rise in valuation due 
to higher income. On the other hand, most impact studies conducted so far have 
neglected possible increases in tropical diseases as well as differences in health 
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care between countries. That is, impact studies may have underestimated intangible 
damages. 
In addition to affluence, other aspects of global change (e.g., globalization, soil 
erosion, deforestation, urbanisation, pollution) may also affect vulnerability to cli- 
mate change, and this in either direction. It is generally accepted that systems which 
are already under great stress (e.g., agriculture suffering from soil erosion; peo- 
ple suffering under urban air pollution) will be more vulnerable to climate change. 
Ironically, if exogenous stress is too high, this may also diminish impacts, however, 
in the sense that ecosystems may be damaged beyond repair before climate change 
sets in. Coral reefs may be an example. Other processes, particularly economic 
globalization, could also reduce vulnerability by interconnecting markets, capital 
flows, and technology. To date, very little is known about these processes and their 
interrelationships with vulnerability to climate change. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we assess trends leading from the current state of the art of damage 
estimates, as reflected in the IPCC Second Assessment Report, to a new generation 
of improved estimates. Earlier studies estimate an aggregated monetised damage 
in the order of 1.5 to 2.0The OECD face damages equivalent to 1.0 to 1.5 % of 
GDP. Damage in developing countries would amount to 2.0 to 9.0 % of GDP. These 
figures are not comprehensive and highly uncertain. Ongoing research continues 
to update and extend the estimates, but formal assessments of uncertainty remain 
rare. 
Newer studies increasingly emphasise the power of adaptation, the importance 
of weather variability and extreme events, the influence of other stress factors than 
climate change, and the need for integrated assessment of damages. The incorpo- 
ration of these effects has resulted in more pronounced differences in estimates 
between different regions and sectors. Estimates of market damages in developed 
countries have tended to fall, while non-market impacts have become increasingly 
important. 
Marginal damages and damage profiles are more interesting from a policy point 
of view. Earlier estimates of the marginal range from about $5 to $125 per tonne of 
carbon, with most estimates at the lower end of this range. These figures are based 
on polynomial damage functions with only one parameter: the level of climate 
change. Arguably, the rate of change may be equally important, though, as are 
the speed of adaptation, damage restoration and value adjustment. Unfortunately, 
little explicit attention has been paid to these matters thus far. In addition, future 
vulnerability to climate change may differ from current vulnerability. A common 
assumption is that market damages may grow at a lower rate than GDP, while 
non-market damages could grow at a higher rate. Mortality and morbidity losses 
may be an exception from this rule. For health related impacts one would expect 
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the absolute number of casualties to fall over time, as medical standards improve, 
while at the same time the value people assign to a lower mortality risk may rise 
as per capita income grows. 
In sum, the first generation of estimates of the damage costs of climate change 
is being substantially updated, extended and complemented, without, as yet, inval- 
idating the earlier results. Among the most crucial research topics for the next 
period are: 
(a) Impact on developing countries (cf. Section 1); 
(b) Assessment and valuation of non-market losses, particularly human morbidity, 
unmanaged ecosystems, and irreversibilities (cf. Section 2); 
(c) Weather variability and extreme weather events (cf. Section 4); 
(d) Adaptation and adaptation policies (cf. Section 4); 
(e) Vulnerability changes and vulnerability mitigation (cf. Section 5); 
(f) Interlinkages between effects (cf. Section 1); 
(g) Indirect effects on economy and environment (cf. Section 1); 
(h) Uncertainty assessments and analyses (cf. Section 2); 
(i) Equity and responsibility aspects of impact valuation, comparison and aggre- 
gation (cf. Section 3); and 
(j) Communication and consistency between climatology, primary impact research 
and economic valuation (cf. Section 4). 
The length of this research agenda is suggestive of the still rudimentary stage of 
the impact assessment of climate change. A major research effort will be required 
between now and the Third Assessment Report of the IPCC. 
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